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          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-1999 
______________ 
 
JAMES S. COLLIER; 
MARY ELIZABETH COLLIER, H/W, 
         Appellants 
v. 
 
CSX TRANSPORTATION INC 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-06823) 
Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, District Judge 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2016 
 
BEFORE:  FISHER, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 16, 2016) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff-Appellant James Collier filed suit against CSX Transportation, Inc. in 
2015 because he suffers from lung cancer that he alleges arose from his exposure to 
asbestos while working for CSX, a railroad company, and its predecessors-in-interest in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  In 1994, he had settled an earlier action against CSX that included 
claims for injuries for exposure to asbestos during his employment.  In furtherance of the 
settlement, Collier executed a document releasing CSX from all future claims based on 
exposure to a number of different contaminants, including claims for cancer arising out of 
his exposure to asbestos.  Therefore, not surprisingly, when Collier filed suit against CSX 
in 2015 for a claim related to his asbestos exposure and his new cancer diagnosis, CSX 
moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based 
on the agreement settling Collier’s earlier action.  The District Court granted CSX’s 
motion and Collier appeals.   
On this appeal, Collier claims that the release agreement does not bar this action 
because (1) under § 5 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 55, 
all contracts that “enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability” created 
by that act are to that extent void, and (2) the Supreme Court decision Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 123 S.Ct. 1210 (2003), dealing with claims arising from 
railroad workers’ exposure to asbestos precludes CSX’s reliance on the release as a 
defense.  He further contends that the District Court erred in granting CSX’s Rule 
12(b)(6) motion because in his complaint he made allegations that supported granting 
him relief.  Appellant’s br. at 6.  We conclude that our opinion in Wicker v. Conrail, 142 
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F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 1998), controls on this appeal, and that the application of Ayers does 
not preserve Collier’s claim.  Therefore, inasmuch as the release agreement validly bars 
recovery by Collier in this lawsuit, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal 
entered on March 23, 2016. 
 
I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
          The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the Court’s 
grant of a motion to dismiss.  See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2009).   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
Collier alleges that the facts, which we accept on this appeal, are as follows.  For 
17 years, from 1961 until 1978, Collier worked as a carman-welder for CSX and its 
predecessors-in-interest in Kentucky.  Appellant’s br. at 3.  Approximately 12 years after 
this employment, he was diagnosed with a non-malignant disease from his exposure to 
asbestos while he had been working for CSX.  Id.  He subsequently filed suit under the 
FELA alleging that he was “required to work amidst excessive amounts of naphthalene, 
xylene, silica sand, asbestos, petroleum thinners, epoxy and urathane [sic] paints and 
other types of chemical contaminants and the dust particles, mist, fumes and gases of the 
aforementioned contaminants” which “caused him to suffer severe and permanent injury 
to his person.”  App. at 27.   
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The parties ultimately settled the foregoing suit in 1994 for $7,500.  Appellant’s 
br. at 3.  In the settlement, in relevant part, Collier released CSX 
of and from all liability for all claims for occupational disease or personal 
injury now known to have resulted or suspected to have resulted from [his] 
employment with [CSX], and also for all known and unknown, manifested 
and unmanifested, suspected and unanticipated diseases or injuries, 
including cancer, arising from or contributed to by exposure to any and all 
toxic substances, including but not limited to, sand, silica, diesel fumes, 
welding fumes, coal dust, chemicals, toxic and/or pathogenic particulate 
matters, liquids, solids, dusts, fumes, vapors mists or gases, and exposure to 
and ingestion of asbestos while employed by [CSX].  The parties agree that 
a portion of the monies paid for this RELEASE AGREEMENT is for risk, 
fear and/or possible future manifestation of either the effects of and/or 
injury or disease due to alleged exposure to such substances as described in 
this paragraph. 
 
App. at 23.   
In 2014,  Collier was diagnosed with asbestos-related lung cancer and he 
subsequently filed another lawsuit under the FELA against CSX, the appeal from the 
dismissal of which is before us now.  Id. at 15.  In this new action, he alleges that he “has 
developed symptoms due to his asbestos inhalations and injuries.  [He] believes and 
therefore avers that his lung cancer was the result of his asbestos exposure on the 
railroad.”  Id. at 17.   
 CSX filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and attached to its motion 
a copy of the original release agreement,1 the 1994 complaint, and the consent order 
dismissing the 1994 case with prejudice.  Id. at 19-32.  The District Court granted CSX’s 
                                              
1 The District Court regarded the release as a public record as it was filed.  Collier does 
not challenge this treatment. 
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motion, holding that the release agreement barred Collier’s claims.  Id. at 3.  Collier has 
appealed.    
III. DISCUSSION 
Because our review of the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is plenary, we 
apply the same standard as that Court.  See Carpenters Health v. Mgmt. Res. Sys., Inc., 
837 F.3d 378, 382 (3d Cir. 2016).  In our review, we “must accept all factual allegations 
in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and 
ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010).  We 
have held that, “[i]n deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 
undisputedly authentic documents if the complaintant’s claims are based upon these 
documents.”  Id. at 230.  The parties do not dispute the authenticity of the release 
agreement and have provided a joint appendix which includes the 1994 complaint and 
subsequent order dismissing the prior case with prejudice.  Therefore, we will analyze (1) 
whether the release agreement bars this action in light of § 5 of the FELA and (2) 
whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was warranted. 
 
1. The Enforceability of the Release Agreement 
The parties focus on the application of Ayers and Wicker.  Collier maintains that 
the Supreme Court in Ayers interpreted § 5 of the FELA liberally and concluded that it 
“indicated a congressional intent to bar any settlement for any injury other than that 
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which was at issue.”  Appellant’s br. at 9.  He further asserts that “Ayers expressly ruled 
that if it allowed a worker to recover for the risk of cancer, that [sic] a later lawsuit for the 
manifestation of the cancer itself would permit a double recovery.”  Id.  According to his 
reading of Ayers, “[a]lthough the Supreme Court recognized that a railroad worker could 
settle a FELA claim, § 5 only permitted the worker to include known risks that flowed 
from the known injuries in the settlement.”  Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).  Further, he 
contends that the Supreme Court recognized that asbestos-related cancer was separate 
from non-malignant asbestos-related diseases.  Id. at 10.  Therefore, he argues that a 
settlement for exposure to asbestosis could not validly cover claims for asbestos-related 
cancer.  He also asserts that the District Court misread Wicker in holding that the release 
agreement was enforceable.  Id. at 11-12.   
CSX counters that Collier did not mention Ayers in his memorandum in the 
District Court opposing CSX’s motion for summary judgment, Ayers is irrelevant to the 
current case because it did not mention § 5, and the District Court properly applied 
Wicker.  Appellee’s br. at 19-25.   
Ayers does not provide guidance that assists us in resolving the issue before us.  In 
Ayers, the Supreme Court addressed whether employees who developed asbestosis from 
exposure to asbestos while working for a railroad can recover “pain and suffering” 
damages under the FELA because of their fear of developing cancer.  Ayers, 538 U.S. at 
140, 123 S.Ct. at 1214.  The Court held that the employees could make such recoveries.  
Id. at 141, 123 S.Ct. at 1215.  But the Court did not discuss § 5, and, instead, discussed 
how its holding comported with the law in jurisdictions that followed the “‘separate 
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disease rule,’ under which most courts have held that the statute of limitations runs 
separately for each asbestos-related disease”—an issue entirely unrelated to that in the 
present case.  Id. at 152, 123 S.Ct. at 1221.  Collier relies on the Ayers Court’s 
acknowledgement that in those jurisdictions “claimants may bring a second action if 
cancer develops.”  Id. at 152-53, 123 S.Ct. at 1221.  But neither the majority opinion nor 
the concurring and dissenting opinion in Ayers addressed the question of whether an 
employee in settling a lawsuit based on asbestos exposure can waive his or her right to 
bring a subsequent action based on future complications from his exposure to asbestos. 
Unlike Ayers, Wicker guides our evaluation of whether § 5 of the FELA prevents 
enforcement of the release agreement.  In Wicker, we “h[e]ld that § 5 of [the] FELA 
allows an employer to negotiate a release of claims with an employee provided the 
release is limited to those risks which are known by the parties at the time the release is 
negotiated.”  Wicker, 142 F.3d at 702.  In adopting this “known risks” standard, we 
rejected the “known injury” standard, which would “limit[] [a] release to those injuries 
known to the employee at the time the release is executed.”  Id. at 700.  Under the 
“known risks” standard, “a release does not violate § 5 provided it is executed for valid 
consideration as part of a settlement, and the scope of the release is limited to those risks 
which are known to the parties at the time the release is signed.”  Id. at 701.  We 
recognized a limit: “Claims relating to unknown risks do not constitute ‘controversies,’ 
and may not be waived under § 5 of FELA.”  Id.  We adopted the known risk standard 
because “it is entirely conceivable that both employee and employer could fully 
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comprehend future risks and potential liabilities and, for different reasons, want an 
immediate and permanent settlement.”  Id. at 700. 
We concluded in Wicker that the parties’ intent was paramount in considering 
these provisions’ enforceability.  Id.  Thus, a written release is “not conclusive” in itself, 
and the inquiry into its validity is “fact-intensive.”  Id. at 701.  An employee may 
“attack” a boilerplate agreement that “include[s] an extensive catalog of every chemical 
and hazard known to railroad employment.”  Id.  In that decision, we also provided some 
guidelines for use in determining parties’ intent.  Thus, if a release “chronicles the scope 
and duration of the known risks, it would supply strong evidence in support of the release 
defense.”  Id.  But if a “specific known risk or malady is not mentioned in the release, it 
would seem difficult for the employer to show it was known to the employee and that he 
or she intended to release liability for it.”  Id.  
In Wicker, we acknowledged that the Supreme Court has held that the party 
attacking the enforceablility of a release agreement bears the burden of proof, a burden 
that the plaintiffs met in Wicker.  Id. at 696.  Wicker concerned a situation where several 
employees settled claims unrelated to chemical exposures that led to their later injuries.  
Id. at 699.  Their releases covered a broad range of exposure to chemicals.  Id. at 693-94.  
In the later cases, each employee contended either that he had not known that he had been 
exposed to the chemical at issue or that he was unaware that his release for back injuries 
also waived future chemical exposure claims.  Id. at 692-94.  Hence the employees were 
able to successfully attack the release provision’s enforceability on the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
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Here, the undisputed documents show that the “known risks” standard has been 
satisfied and the release agreement is enforceable.  The release including the monetary 
payment was given to settle the prior lawsuit.  In that prior action, Collier sued in part for 
issues arising out of asbestos exposure.  Obviously, when Collier filed suit in 1994 based 
on his exposure to asbestos among other contaminants, he demonstrated his knowledge 
that he had been exposed to asbestos.  Under the “known risk” test, the issue is not, as 
Collier contends, whether his prior asbestos-related injury would develop into cancer—it 
is whether he was aware of his exposure to asbestos and the risk that the exposure could 
cause cancer.  Therefore, contrary to Collier’s contentions on this appeal, we need not 
consider evidence on which he relies that his prior injury is separate from the cancer for 
which he seeks a recovery in determining whether cancer was a known risk when Collier 
settled his asbestos-related suit.   
Rather, we only need consider the validity of those provisions concerning 
asbestos, the subject of the current suit.  Notwithstanding the circumstance that the scope 
of the release seems fairly co-extensive with the scope of the contamination claimed in 
the initial complaint, as the District Court pointed out CSX is only attempting to enforce 
the part of the release involving cancer from exposure to asbestos.  The release itself 
specifically mentioned cancer arising from asbestos exposure.  Inasmuch as Collier 
demonstrated his knowledge of that exposure in filing his initial 1994 complaint and only 
the part of the release agreement that details that known risk is at issue here, that 
agreement is enforceable to defeat his asbestos-related claims. 
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2. The Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal 
 Notwithstanding the settlement agreement, Collier contends, using a pre-Twombly 
standard (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), that the 
District Court improperly dismissed the case.  Our standard of review on this issue is not 
as Collier asserts whether “it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under 
any set of facts which could be proved,” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 
2005), but rather is whether Collier would be entitled to relief based on whether the 
allegations in the complaint “plausibly give rise to a right to relief,” taking into 
consideration the documents detailed above.  Carpenters Health, 837 F.3d at 382 
(emphasis in original).  Collier maintains that the Court should have denied CSX’s 
motion to dismiss and instead waited to consider the evidence on a motion for summary 
judgment.2  Appellant’s br. at 16.  He further argues that the Court should have 
considered evidence that asbestosis does not cause cancer.  Id.  He also contends that the 
settlement agreement was inconclusive because it failed to provide the “quantity, location 
and duration” of the asbestos exposure, circumstances that Wicker recognized are helpful 
in determining a party’s intent in signing a release agreement.  Id. 
 As we have stated above, on consideration of a motion to dismiss, a court may 
consider unquestionably authentic exhibits in determining whether a plaintiff plausibly 
would be entitled to relief.  Collier sued CSX based on his exposure to asbestos and 
                                              
2 Collier also argues that the District Court should have considered the motion pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) dealing with a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings rather than pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Appellant’s br. at 2.  But in this case a 
consideration under Rule 12(c) was not necessary for Collier indicates that “[t]he 
standard and scope of review of [the two motions] are essentially the same.”  Id. 
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settled that claim by executing a release that specifically released any claim for cancer 
that might arise from his work-related exposure to asbestos.  Moreover, he could not 
plausibly claim that he did not know that cancer was a risk of asbestos exposure, and it 
would be implausible to conclude that he did not know of his exposure to asbestos when 
he settled his prior asbestos-related case. Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed 
this case. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal of 
March 23, 2016.  
 
